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Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints

Abstract

The design of truthful auctions that approximate the optimal expected revenue is a central problem in algorithmic mechanism design. 30 years after Myerson's characterization of Bayesian optimal auctions in single-parameter domains [8], characterizing but also providing efficient mechanisms for multi-parameter domains still remains a very important unsolved problem. Our work improves upon recent results in this area, introducing new techniques for tackling the problem, while also combining and extending recently introduced tools. In particular we give the first approximation algorithms for Bayesian auctions with multiple heterogeneous items when bidders have additive valuations, budget constraints and general matroid feasibility constraints.

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Citation
Category
Paper in Conference Proceedings or in Workshop Proceedings (Paper)
Event Title
19th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2011)
Divisions
Theory and Applications of Algorithms
Subjects
Webentwicklung, Webanwendungen
Angewandte Informatik
Theoretische Informatik
Event Location
Saarbruecken, Germany
Event Type
Conference
Event Dates
September 5-9, 2011
Publisher
Springer
Date
September 2011
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