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On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets

Abstract

We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded. We show the following results: (1) We give the first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and deterministic mechanism for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and deterministic mechanisms for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations.

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Authors
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Editors
  • Artur Czumaj
  • Kurt Mehlhorn
  • Andrew Pitts
  • Roger Wattenhofer
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Citation
Category
Paper in Conference Proceedings or in Workshop Proceedings (Paper)
Event Title
39th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2012)
Divisions
Theory and Applications of Algorithms
Event Location
Warwick, United Kingdom
Event Type
Conference
Event Dates
9-13 Jul 2012
Series Name
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN/ISBN
978-3-642-31584-8
Publisher
Springer
Page Range
pp. 1-12
Date
2012
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_1
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