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On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets


We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded. We show the following results: (1) We give the first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and deterministic mechanism for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and deterministic mechanisms for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations.

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Paper in Conference Proceedings or in Workshop Proceedings (Paper)
Event Title
8th Workshop on Ad Auctions
Theory and Applications of Algorithms
Event Location
Valencia, Spain
Event Type
Event Dates
8 Jun 2012
Series Name
Online Proceedings
Official URL
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